Putting on the brakes : certificate of need regulations try to steer health-care supplies, but it's hard to keep them from fishtailing by Charles Gerena
BY CHARLES GERENA
E
very month, members of the
board of directors for the
Central Virginia Health Plan-
ning Agency Inc. gather in a blue-gray
meeting room. The conservative color
scheme is everywhere, even in the
speckled fabric of the chairs where the
board members sit. Only one thing
sticks out: the honey-colored wooden
podium where health-care providers
pitch their proposals for new facilities
and equipment.
In Virginia and throughout the rest
of the Fifth District, providers must
obtain a certificate of need (CON)
before making major capital invest-
ments. They have to demonstrate that
the expenditure is necessary to fulfill
the needs of the community, which are
determined by state health officials and
detailed in a formal plan. 
At the January meeting of Central
Virginia’s health planning board, three
groups explained why the region needs
additional diagnostic imaging equipment.
Their proposals faced the scrutiny of the
board, which makes its recommenda-
tions to the state health commissioner.
After an hour of presentations, reports,
and intense questioning, two of the three
CON applicants were rebuffed. Afourth
applicant withdrew from consideration
before the meeting.
Many economists question the neces-
sity of regulating the health-care supply
so closely. Their view is that companies
introduce goods and services only when
they expect to be rewarded with higher
revenue and profits. Meanwhile, con-
sumers usually benefit from the
increased competition in the form of
broader choices and better prices. In
short, markets tend to work pretty well
by themselves. 
But state health planners and other
CON supporters counter that health care
isn’t a typical market. They believe that
government must intervene to minimize
unnecessary development and improve
the accessibility and quality of care. 
“We are coping with an imperfect
system,” notes Pamela Barclay, deputy
director of health resources for the
Maryland Health Care Commission,
which reviews CON applications.
Instead of consumers buying health care
directly, government- and employer-pro-
vided insurance pays for it. But some
medical services are reimbursed at
higher rates than others and not every-
one has the same level of coverage,
creating distortions in the market.
The CON process is also imperfect,
but states have used it to address prob-
lems in an industry that affects every-
one’s well being.
CON to the Rescue
Health-care planning dates back to the
1940s. During the Great Depression
and World War II, few hospitals were
being built or updated, and the supply
of medical facilities was inadequately
distributed among and within states.
Communities responded to this crisis
by financing and planning hospital
development themselves, sometimes
with the help of government agencies.
In 1946, their efforts were aided by
federal subsidies.
States began regulating the supply
of health care through certificate of
need reviews in the 1960s and ’70s,
partly in response to lobbying from hos-
pital operators who favored centralized
health planning. By 1974, Congress
required states to have a CON program
in order to receive federal dollars for
psychiatric, substance abuse, and other
health services. It also approved direct
funding of CON programs. 
“States weren’t seen as micromanag-
ing health-care markets. It was routine
for communities to be involved in plan-
ning,” says John Steen, a New Jersey-
based medical consultant who serves on
the board of directors for the American
Health Planning Association (AHPA).
Also, “states and federal officials
were really concerned about rising
costs,” notes Frank Sloan, director of
Duke University’s Center for Health
Policy, Law, and Management. “CON
was the first major cost containment
program implemented.” 
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theThe idea was that by controlling the
expansion of health-care supplies, fewer
development costs would be placed on
the shoulders of consumers. At the time,
cost-based reimbursement systems—
especially the massive Medicaid and
Medicare programs created in the
1960s—enabled health-care providers to
pass along most of the expense of new
equipment and services to third parties.
Since capital improvements could trans-
late into increased revenue with little
downside risk, providers were perceived
as having an incentive to over-invest. 
Lastly, state and federal lawmakers
were concerned about health care
quality and access. By using CON
reviews to steer new development, they
aimed to prevent providers from
expanding only in affluent areas that
were already well served. According to
Lee Hoffman, chief of the CON
program at the North Carolina Divi-
sion of Facility Services, if there is no
designated need for additional services
in a metropolitan area, “providers
prefer to take their chances in a rural
area [rather than have] nothing at all.
It gets their foot in the door.” 
CON programs proliferated until
the early 1980s when the federal gov-
ernment changed how it paid health-
care providers. Under a new per-case
prospective payment system, providers
received a predetermined amount of
money for each patient treated, regard-
less of the cost of the services required.
The amount paid depended primarily
on the diagnosis-related group into
which the patient was classified. 
Private health insurers adopted this
payment system as well, which removed
the incentive to over-invest that many
policymakers had been concerned with.
Meanwhile, market-based approaches
such as managed care emerged as alter-
natives for containing medical costs,
which were still rising despite the wide-
spread usage of CON reviews. 
In 1986, the federal government
stopped funding CON programs and
14 states eventually abandoned their
programs. Today, 36 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia regulate health-care
supplies to varying degrees. Virginia
lawmakers backed off from eliminating
the state’s CON regulations in 2001,
while West Virginia, Maryland, and the
Carolinas have reviewed or revised
their regulations over the last five years
instead of eliminating them.
Why does more than two-thirds of
the nation still conduct CON reviews?
Part of the reason is political pressure,
particularly from health-care providers
with an established market presence. 
State lawmakers also believe that
CON reviews give communities a voice
in health-care development. Public
hearings are usually held before a CON
application is considered and whenever
a state’s health plan is being updated.
“It’s a process in which providers and
consumers of services can get together,
examine problems, and exercise their
best judgement,” says Dean Mont-
gomery, current AHPA president and
executive director of the Health
Systems Agency of Northern Virginia.
States have another motive for
trying to maneuver health-care sup-
plies: They have a big stake in con-
taining medical costs. In communities
with a low concentration of businesses,
a big chunk of medical services are
reimbursed through Medicaid and
insurance provided to state employees. 
And there is reason to be worried
about health-care providers gaining
more pricing power and increasing
their capital investments. Despite the
changes in medical reimbursement,
insurers have less power to negotiate
lower rates with providers. “In the late
’80s and early ’90s, they were able to
[reduce costs] the easy way because
there was fat in the system,” says
medical consultant John Steen. But
managed care has reached its limits in
cost reduction and people have been
demanding more services.
The Verdict
Has this faith in the certificate of need
process been justified? It depends on
what criteria you use. 
Constraining the health-care supply
via CON review may have tempered
growth in hospital beds and nursing
home development. But it hasn’t been
conclusively shown to slow growth in
overall per-capita medical spending. 
“While CON laws can be effective
in slowing the expansion of some serv-
ices, many other factors affect health-
care costs (e.g., labor, physicians serv-
ices) that CON laws have not attempted
to control,” noted a January 1999 study
by the University of Washington. Fur-
thermore, a 1998 study by Duke Uni-
versity’s Frank Sloan and Christopher
Conover didn’t find a marked increase
in health-care expenditures in states that
dropped CON reviews.
Meanwhile, CON regulations may
sometimes constrain supplies too well,
making it difficult for health-care
providers to respond to market
changes. Let’s say an imaging center
wants to buy another MRI machine
because its existing equipment is oper-
ating 18 hours a day and on weekends
to keep up with demand. The center
may fail to get a CON because there is
underutilized capacity elsewhere, even
though that capacity may be in a less-
populated area, inconvenient to
patients, or outdated. 
Additionally, hospitals can be pre-
vented from moving capacity to high-
growth areas or redesigning it for
services that are in greater demand.
Charlotte Lynch, manager of business
planning at Gaston Memorial Hospital
near Charlotte, N.C., recalls how she
struggled to obtain a CON to redis-
tribute its unused bed capacity to the
hospital’s Women Center. Initially, the
state wanted to de-license 40-plus
acute care beds in the hospital’s inven-
tory before it would approve the CON.
Rather than relinquish capacity that
was needed to accommodate future
growth, the hospital eventually gave up
some of its psychiatric beds.
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S“As soon as you want to expand… and
you’re not at the target occupancy, their
thinking is ‘Let’s take some of this
excess capacity away from them because
they don’t need it,’” complains Lynch.
Health-care providers can make
adjustments to the CON process or the
state health plan via the public review
process. But some states take at least
a year to update their plan, while other
states have much longer planning hori-
zons. And there’s no guarantee that
providers will get the changes they
want. Lynch says it took years before
North Carolina recognized a need for
acute care beds.
State officials would be hard-pressed
to admit these shortcomings in CON
programs. Instead, they have moved
cost containment down their list of
policy goals and emphasized CON’s
role in meeting an equally important
goal: to intervene in health-care
markets when accessibility and quality
take a backseat to profits.
How much state governments inter-
vene in markets depends on how many
medical services they regulate and how
large a capital investment must be
before it is subject to CON review.
Maryland and West Virginia regulate a
wide range of medical services under
CON and have relatively low capital
cost thresholds, plus they review hos-
pital rates. The Carolinas, Virginia, and
the District of Columbia have com-
prehensive programs as well, while the
latter two still have regional health
planning agencies that evaluate CON
applications.
An agency under the state’s depart-
ment of health typically evaluates appli-
cations to determine how proposed
projects meet the state’s health plan.
The plan identifies the quantity and
type of services needed in certain
regions based on population growth,
utilization rates, and other data. Then
anyone can apply for a CON to meet
these needs. 
Other criteria are also used to deter-
mine if a proposed project is in the
public interest. They include the
project’s economic impact on existing
facilities, the applicant’s history of pro-
viding charity care, and the geographic
accessibility of the project. 
With the latter, one would think
that the development of health-care
infrastructure should follow population
growth. “In some respects that’s true,”
says Ken Cook, president of Roanoke,
Va.-based Vantage Healthcare Con-
sulting Group Inc. and former execu-
tive director of southwest Virginia’s
health planning agency. “But we also
want to force [development] to move
out into surrounding areas.” For
example, Lynchburg has more nursing
home beds per thousand seniors com-
pared to the four rural counties sur-
rounding the city. 
Have these market interventions
worked? A recent General Accounting
Office report found that states with
CON programs appear to have better
access to health care because they have
fewer specialty hospitals than states
without CON. Such facilities are less
likely to have an emergency room and
to accept Medicaid patients. On the
other hand, states without CON have
slightly more general hospitals than
non-CON states, and these facilities
have to serve everyone. (See pie charts.)
On the whole, “it is very difficult to
steer” the development of medical
services, notes Frank Sloan. There have
been some attempts to prevent hospi-
tals from moving from the inner city
to the suburbs, but they have failed to
prevent health care providers from
chasing population growth.
It’s Good at Playing Monopoly
Most health-care economists, consult-
ants, and regulators would agree that
certificate of need regulations have
been good at one thing—producing
markets with varying levels of protec-
tion. Such markets affect access and
quality of medical care, both positively
and negatively. 
“Health care is a service where a sig-
nificant portion of the population
cannot afford to pay for it because they
are underinsured or uninsured,” ex-
plains Lynn Bailey, a consulting econo-
mist in Columbia, S.C. By awarding a
limited number of CONs for particu-
lar services in a geographic area, states
essentially create franchised territories
for general hospitals in exchange for
them serving the entire population. “It
is a social contract.”
In general, protected markets have
a high cost of entry. The CON appli-
cation process can take several years,
especially if there are appeals, and
require tens of thousands of dollars
to pay for consultants, lawyers, and
processing fees. But once a health-
care provider gets its “franchise” for
offering a certain service, it’s in a
better position to charge higher
prices and generate a reliable revenue
stream because others can’t readily
follow. “If you have a monopoly in a
town, an insurer has to negotiate with
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Path of Least Resistance
Specialty hospitals tend to stay away from states where medical facilities have to obtain a certificate
of need to add capacity, as shown below. Is that good or bad? Specialty hospitals outperform
general hospitals in terms of costs, but they are less likely to have an emergency room and they
treat a smaller percentage of Medicaid patients.
NOTE: Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia were counted as “CON States” because they require a certificate of need
to develop acute care beds. The total number of states with a certificate of need process of any type is much higher (36).



















Distribution of U.S. Population Distribution of Specialty Hospitals Distribution of General Hospitalsthat monopolist. It’s not going to get
the same price as an insurer who has
the ability to take its business else-
where,” explains Sloan. This probably
doesn’t help contain costs, but it does
make it easier for providers to acquire
credit and invest in new technology
and staff training. 
Another benefit of market protec-
tion is that it supposedly prevents a
specialty facility from entering a com-
munity and cherry picking profitable
outpatient services like ambulatory
surgery and cardiac catheterization.
While cherry picking is a savvy busi-
ness move, it could hurt long-estab-
lished general hospitals that use
moneymaking outpatient services to
pay for money-losing inpatient services
like the emergency room. Hospitals
must compete to hold on to their best
customers while caring for the indigent
and uninsured whom they are legally
required to serve regardless of their
ability to pay. 
On the other hand, companies
usually have less incentive to be inno-
vative and efficient if they don’t have
to face the constant challenges of com-
petition. So health planners perform a
delicate balancing act. “If you design
your CON program right so that you
allow enough competitors to get in, you
won’t make an inefficient system. ...
Providers will have to compete on
quality,” says Cook.
Finally, limiting the growth of new
medical capacity may help build up the
volume of procedures at existing facil-
ities. This would enable providers to
spread out the cost of equipment over
more patients. It also would enable
medical professionals to gain experi-
ence that helps them improve patient
outcomes, which is why malpractice
insurers often refuse to provide cover-
age unless providers reach a certain
threshold of patient utilization. 
However, CON programs have had
a mixed record when it comes to
increasing patient volume at facilities
and their impact on outcomes hasn’t
been proven. Furthermore, such bene-
fits of limiting medical capacity would
have to be balanced against making
services available to the greatest
number of people, notes Sloan.
Watch Where You Swing 
That Thing!
In the final analysis, the certificate of
need has been a blunt instrument of
public policy. So why not let health-care
markets figure out the best combina-
tion of supply and demand? Then state
governments could deal with quality
and access problems by establishing
standards for care and expanding public
medical facilities.
CON advocates argue that health-
care markets can’t fix themselves
because they are dysfunctional. For one
thing, patients usually depend on
health-care providers to tell them what
services they need, so providers are in
the position of redirecting patient care
to utilize any new capacity. “It’s not like
buying a car where you can determine
the best quality you can get for the
lowest price. We really depend on
doctors to advise us what facility to go
to and what services we need,” says Joel
Grice, director of the South Carolina
Bureau of Health Facilities and Services
Development, which manages the Pal-
metto State’s CON program.
Health-care markets malfunction
for a less sinister reason as well: They
have little price competition, which
tends to encourage overproduction.
Normally, suppliers produce more as
prices increase until their services
become too expensive for buyers. But
prices for certain medical services can
continue to rise without patients
demanding less.
Why? The demand for many
medical services is very price inelastic.
Patients care more about getting the
best care available than about how
much they’ll pay, especially in an emer-
gency situation or when treatment
options are limited. Also, patients don’t
know the actual costs of their care.
Market information is not readily avail-
able, plus insurers act as a third party
that separates patients from providers
in transactions. 
Even if these market malfunctions
could be fixed, broad regulation of
health-care markets is more politically
desirable than deregulation. If a nursing
home closed down as a result of market
competition, the cost of relocating
former residents would make the front
page of local newspapers. In contrast,
the shortcomings of CON programs
impact everyone, so it’s not as obvious
to individuals.
Still, government regulation is con-
sidered a necessary evil to protect
patients from the ups and downs of
unfettered market competition. In fact,
some lawmakers and health care
experts believe that health care should-
n’t be a profit-making business. 
Notes economist Lynn Bailey, “We
haven’t resolved the issue of whether
health care is a private good regulated
by market forces—those who pay for
it get it and those who can’t pay for it
don’t—or a public good that benefits
the entire community.” European coun-
tries have long considered health care
a public good, but following the same
path in the United States—via univer-
sal health insurance or a government-run
hospital system—wouldn’t be cheap.
Until our society decides how
health-care markets should function,
CON programs will continue trying to
steer supplies in the Fifth District and
throughout the nation. RF
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